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  his analysis provides an overview of 
federal pediatric drug safety policy. It also 
assesses the economic effectiveness of one 
aspect of this policy, known as “pediatric exclusivity.”
         
The safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals 
for children is a fundamental aspect of overall 
pediatric health policy. Moreover, the growing 
focus on patient safety and medical error re-
duction, as well as evidence of growing insurer 
resistance to coverage of off-label prescribing 
(which is the most common means by which 
physicians prescribe drugs to children), have 
combined to make pediatric drug safety a mat-
ter of mounting policy importance. Indeed, two-
thirds of all drugs prescribed for children have 
not been tested and labeled for pediatric use.  
Current federal policy provides a “carrot and 
stick” approach to pediatric drug safety. The 
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) 
encourages drug companies to voluntarily test 
drugs for pediatric safety in response to an 
FDA request, by granting a six-month period of 
market exclusivity. The Pediatric Research 
Equity Act of 2003 (PREA) empowers the FDA 
to require pediatric drug studies under certain 
conditions. Both laws contain “sunset” provi-
sions and are set to expire in October 2007.
BPCA has helped contribute to expanded drug 
testing, which in turn has led to labeling im-
provements. Better labeling might reasonably 
be expected to lead to more appropriate pre-
scribing in accordance with clinical guidelines, 
which in turn would promote greater patient 
compliance. As compliance improves, health 
care costs are affected. Asthma, for example, 
is a pediatric condition in which noncompli-
ance with clinical guidelines greatly contrib-
utes to significant and unnecessary pediatric 
hospitalization rates. To predict potential sav-
ings resulting from better compliance through 
improved labeling, this analysis: calculated the 
cost of hospitalizations resulting from adverse 
drug reactions, obtained aggregate estimates 
of direct medical costs other than hospitaliza-
tions, and considered indirect costs arising 
from childhood asthma. Based on 2002 data 
trended forward to 2005 dollars, we estimate 
that increased compliance would result in a 
$96 million reduction in hospitalization costs, 
a $107 million reduction in non-hospital costs, 
a $16 million reduction in the loss of caregiver 
productivity and $5.29 million in savings relat-
ed to adverse drug reactions (ADR). In total, 
we estimate that for asthma alone, the poten-
tial cost savings associated with improved pe-
diatric labeling could reach some $225 million 
annually. 
Our analysis suggests the beneficial effects 
of a robust pediatric testing policy that relies 
in part on reasonable incentives, as well as 
on additional safeguards aimed at ensuring 
that necessary testing in fact happens.  This 
analysis underscores the patient and societal 
benefits of testing.  As a result, we recommend 
strengthening BPCA to include a provision that 
would ensure that where a testing request 
is declined, manufacturers furnish clear and 
convincing evidence of net financial losses 
associated with testing in relation to the in-
centives promised. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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INTRODUCTION 
This policy analysis examines the effective-
ness of pediatric exclusivity, one of the policy 
approaches the federal government uses to 
promote drug safety for children. Federal policy 
in this area is highly complex, and provisions 
related to pediatric drug safety, including pe-
diatric exclusivity, are set to expire in 2007. 
Following a policy overview, this analysis sum-
marizes the impact of pediatric exclusivity and 
reports on the results of our effort to shed light 
on the economic value of pediatric exclusivity. 
The analysis concludes with a discussion of op-
tions for further promoting a safe environment 
for drug use in children.
The safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals for 
children is of fundamental importance to sound, 
national pediatric health policy. In the modern 
health care system, pharmaceuticals play a 
prominent role in health care, and the appro-
priate use of prescription drug therapies can 
dramatically affect the course, quality, and out-
come of patient treatment. Furthermore, drug 
safety protections are essential to lowering the 
risk of adverse outcomes. 
Yet drug safety protections for children are sig-
nificantly less than optimal. The United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) re-
cently reported that approximately two-thirds 
of all drugs prescribed for children have not 
been tested and labeled for pediatric use (GAO 
2007), and this figure is supported by earlier 
research (Budetti 2003, 950-951). Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) data suggest that 
only 20% to 30% of drugs granted marketing 
approval have an approved pediatric indica-
tion (Meadows 2003, 12-17). One hospital-
based study conducted from January through 
June 2004 found that 31% of drugs used were 
prescribed off-label in relation to either indica-
tion or age. The majority of indication-related 
off-label uses involved gastrointestinal and re-
spiratory disorders, while off-label uses related 
to age mainly involved asthma medications 
and anti-convulsants (Eiland et al. 2006, 1062-
1065). A more comprehensive study of pediat-
ric off-label use in hospitals found that almost 
80% of children receive off-label medications 
(Shah et al. 2007, 282-290). Indeed, off-label 
use in children is so pervasive that the practice 
is considered a “cornerstone of pediatric medi-
cal therapeutics” (Budetti 2003, 950-951).
The need for a comprehensive approach to en-
suring pediatric drug testing and labeling has 
taken on added importance in recent years, as 
third party payer cost containment efforts have 
come to focus increasingly on off-label pre-
scribing, which represents the principal means 
by which drugs are used in children given the 
absence of a robust testing policy. Indeed, the 
potential for cost containment reforms to im-
plicate the primary means by which drugs are 
prescribed for children is not speculative. While 
the extent of insurer coverage practices where 
off-label use is concerned is not known, one 
state already has enacted Medicaid reforms 
that, until subsequently modified, would have 
denied coverage for virtually all off-label drug 
use by limiting coverage to pharmaceuticals 
shown to be safe and effective for a specific 
indication (Schneider 2004). 
In sum, the absence of a sufficient pediatric 
drug testing policy threatens not only to reduce 
quality and safety but also to “leave children 
behind” (Iyasu et al. 2007, 497-508) where 
advances in prescription drug therapy are con-
cerned, to the extent that insurers begin to deny 
coverage for off-label therapies.
BACKGROUND 
Pediatric drug testing as a health care and public health policy imperative
The early policy framework for pediatric drug safety 
Government possesses the inherent power to 
protect patients from poor quality or unsafe 
health conditions, including the use of inade-
quately tested drugs in children (Gostin 2003). 
Although federal law gives the government the 
authority to require drug testing in children, 
these regulatory powers have been exercised 
but only to a limited degree and not in the case 
of prescribed drugs already on the market. 
Increasingly, the federal government has ad-
opted an incentivization approach to promoting 
pediatric drug safety.
Prior to 1962, federal drug regulatory policy 
required consideration only of the safety of a 
drug proposed for market entry. Legislation 
enacted in 1962 added the dimension of “effi-
cacy” to FDA review, but the legislation neither 
required nor encouraged pediatric studies as 
a specific aim.
Regulations promulgated in 1979 by the FDA 
sought to improve standards by requiring that 
pediatric labeling claims be supported by ad-
1 Funding for this analysis comes from the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation and the American Academy of Pediatrics.
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2  Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 USC).
3 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37, 434 (June 26, 1979) (codified as amended     
  in 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 and 202). 
equate pediatric test data,  but these require-
ments did little to alter the status quo, as the 
agency continued to permit the approval of adult 
drugs untested in children, so long as labeling 
(known as “orphaning clauses”) disclosed the 
lack of pediatric testing. Boilerplate language 
such as “Safety and efficacy in pediatric pa-
tients have not been established” became the 
norm.  Indeed, the 1979 rule appeared to im-
pede rather than spur pediatric drug research, 
since prescription drug manufacturers con-
cluded that disclosure was a more efficient ap-
proach than testing (Breslow 2003, 133).  As a 
result, pediatric testing remained dormant.
However, the rise of HIV/AIDS as a pediatric 
disease sparked a new sense of urgency re-
garding the need for a national pediatric drug 
testing policy (Lynch 2007, 79 and Milne 1999). 
In 1990, the FDA announced a new policy of 
incorporating a “Pediatric Page” into its review 
process for all new molecular entities submit-
ted for approval. This change in policy required 
manufacturers to provide detailed information 
regarding pediatric use, so that the agency 
could assess the adequacy of a prescription 
drug label in a child health context. Manufactur-
ers were also required to disclose any need, 
plans, or agreements with the FDA that were 
related to further studies in children. In prac-
tice, this regulatory scheme tended to simply 
summarize the state of pediatric studies as 
part of the FDA drug review process (Lynch 
2007, FN 78). 
The FDA sought to refine its pediatric policy 
in 1994 by specifying conditions under which 
manufacturers could use adult studies, in ad-
dition to other specific and relevant data, in 
order to support pediatric labeling; however, 
the new policy did not actually require any new 
testing. Drug manufacturers could continue to 
opt for simple disclosure through a disclaimer 
approach if the necessary information was ab-
sent.
A decade of legislative reform
The 1997 enactment of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act  represented 
a major advance in national policy related to 
promoting the safety and quality of pharmaceu-
ticals for children.  Included in the legislation 
was a provision – that has come to be known 
as “pediatric exclusivity”  – whose purpose was 
to encourage pediatric clinical drug trials by 
providing an incentive to pharmaceutical com-
panies. The pediatric exclusivity law was reau-
thorized in 2002 as the Best Pharmaceuticals 
for Children Act (BPCA).   This reauthorization 
was followed in 2003 by the enactment of the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA), which 
complimented the BPCA by requiring compa-
nies to study certain drugs for use in children.  
The BPCA provides a “carrot” for more exten-
sive pediatric drug testing through the use of 
financial incentives, along with the vesting of 
total discretion in pharmaceutical companies 
to determine when incentives are sufficiently 
beneficial to justify testing. In the case of on-
patent drugs, the BPCA carrot consists of an 
additional period of protection from market 
competition (for example, the market entry of a 
generic competitor) when a manufacturer of an 
on-patent drug conducts certain pediatric stud-
ies in response to an FDA request.   
The PREA provides a “stick.” The statute ex-
pressly empowers the FDA to require pediatric 
drug studies where the pediatric indication is 
the same as the adult indication and the agen-
cy has determined that certain criteria are met 
to require pediatric testing.  Because PREA 
emphasizes a more regulatory approach, it ap-
plies regardless of whether a drug or biologic 
product is on-patent or off-patent. 
Both laws contain “sunset” provisions and un-
less they are reauthorized, will expire in Octo-
ber 2007.
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Pediatric exclusivity offers a simple and 
straight-forward incentive: in exchange for 
conducting pediatric trials specifically re-
quested by the FDA, drug manufacturers of 
on-patent drugs – or those applying for ap-
proval of new drugs that will receive patent 
protection if approved – can obtain a six-
month extension of market exclusivity for all 
of their products with the same active ingredi-
ent as the drug under study. During this six-
month extension period, the FDA cannot grant 
marketing approval applications for a generic 
version of the drug where the application for 
marketing approval relies on the safety and 
efficacy data from the originator’s marketing 
application. Thus pediatric exclusivity has the 
effect of delaying generic competition.
The process, as detailed in the BPCA itself, 
is as follows: In cases in which the Secre-
tary determines that “information relating to 
the use of a new drug in the pediatric popu-
lation may produce health benefits for that 
population,” the FDA then makes a written 
request to a manufacturer asking that it con-
duct specific pediatric studies within a certain 
timeframe, the age groups to be tested, and 
the study design and goals. These studies 
are then completed and submitted as part 
of a new drug application or supplement 
thereto for the new pediatric indication of an 
already-marketed drug. The Secretary then 
has 90 days to review the application and 
determine whether the submission meets the 
study requirements and, if so, exclusivity is 
granted; thus, the six-month extension is not 
The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
 4 Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs; Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 59 Fed. Reg. 64, 240    
  (Dec. 13, 1994) (codified as amended in 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
5 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-115 (105th Cong., 1st Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
6 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, P.L. 105-115 (105th Cong., 1st Sess.) amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505A, 21       
  U.S.C. § 355a (b-c) (West Supp. 2006).
7 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
8 Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
9 21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c) (West Supp. 2006). The BPCA provides for additional market exclusivity for drugs protected by patents as well as for other forms of market   
  exclusivity held by the drug manufacturer (i.e., exclusivity for drugs with new chemical entities, drugs designed to treat rare diseases, and for new uses of approved  
  drugs). This report uses the term “on-patent” to describe drugs that have patent protection or another form of market exclusivity. This report uses the term “off-patent”  
  for those drugs whose patent protection or other forms of market exclusivity have expired.
10 21 U.S.C. §355c (b) (1). (West Supp. 2006).
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contingent upon an actual labeling change, 
but instead, on provision by a company of 
data in response to the agency’s request. If 
a new indication or other labeling change is 
warranted, the FDA and the drug company 
then negotiate these changes. But because 
the program is voluntary, a company that re-
ceives an FDA request to conduct a pediatric 
trial can choose whether or not to participate. 
There appears to be no evidence regarding 
the reasons underlying a decline; presumably 
factors such as the cost of the study in rela-
tion to the economic benefit to the firm, or the 
company’s own judgment regarding the need 
for further study would affect a manufactur-
er’s determination (Li et al. 2007).  
The pediatric exclusivity provision was set to 
expire in 2002 but was reauthorized that year 
as the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act. 
Reauthorization followed in the wake of evi-
dence regarding the law’s success in spurring 
pediatric testing and labeling changes (Li et 
al. 2007 and Lynch 2007, 94), as well as evi-
dence regarding a need for further reforms. 
Specifically, an FDA report to Congress in 
2001 found that the exclusivity provision re-
sulted in new studies and “has been highly 
effective in generating pediatric studies on 
many drugs and in providing useful new in-
formation in product labeling” (FDA 2001, i). 
The FDA also noted that the incentive “natu-
rally tended to produce pediatric studies on 
those products where the exclusivity has the 
greatest value,” and noted that the incentive 
was not adequate for old antibiotics and other 
drugs lacking patent protections or for certain 
younger age groups, especially neonates 
(FDA 2001, iii). 
The 2002 law reauthorized the pediatric ex-
clusivity provision for five years and added 
several significant improvements, including 
mechanisms to conduct both studies of on-
patent drugs for which a manufacturer de-
clined a written request and for older off-pat-
ent drugs, a shorter timeline for determining 
labeling changes, and a provision to dissemi-
nate important study and labeling information 
to the public; but did not fundamentally alter 
the actual 1997 legislation regarding pediat-
ric exclusivity. 
To address the gap in pediatric drug trials 
involving off-patent drugs, the 2002 amend-
ments created a “Program for Pediatric Stud-
ies” which established a protocol for testing 
off-patent drugs. Under this protocol, the FDA 
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
are required to develop an annual list of off-
patent/off-exclusivity drugs that the agencies 
believe need to be studied in order to as-
sess safety and efficacy in children. The FDA 
selects an off-patent drug from the list and 
sends a request for pediatric studies to all 
manufacturers that have registered versions 
of the drug. If none respond to this request 
within 30 days, the FDA is then authorized 
to publish a request for proposals and to 
contract with organizations such as univer-
sities, teaching hospitals, contract research 
organizations, laboratories, etc. to conduct 
the relevant trials. As of December 2005, the 
FDA had sent sixteen requests for pediatric 
studies of off-patent drugs to manufacturers 
under this provision. Fifteen were declined by 
the manufacturer(s). Of the fifteen declined 
studies, the NIH has funded seven, spending 
an estimated $52.5 million. One of the rea-
sons the NIH has not pursued more studies 
of off-patent drugs is a lack of funding. The 
NIH does not receive a specific appropriation 
for pediatric drug trials, rather it utilizes ‘lump 
sum appropriations’ received by other insti-
tutes (GAO 2007).  
For on-patent drugs, if a manufacturer de-
clines to perform a pediatric study, the 2002 
BPCA amendments allow the FDA to refer the 
drug to a quasi-governmental “Foundation for 
the National Institutes of Health” (also called 
the Foundation for Pediatric Research), a 
private, non-governmental foundation to 
facilitate the pediatric trials. This Founda-
tion is designated under the law to address 
concerns that, in the event public funding is 
unavailable to conduct the test, independent 
funding can be secured for this purpose. The 
Foundation is empowered to collect funds 
through gifts, donations, and grants, and to 
then award grants for pediatric drug research 
of on-patent drugs to outside groups. If the 
Foundation itself is unable to secure suffi-
cient funds to conduct the study, the FDA can 
then include the drug on the list of drugs for 
the Program for Pediatric Studies described 
above. As of December 2005, the FNIH col-
lected $4.13 million for pediatric drug studies. 
This amount was insufficient to conduct a full 
clinical study but is being used to supplement 
the cost of a clinical trial on baclofen, an on-
patent drug whose manufacturer declined a 
written request (GAO 2007). 
Additional changes made by the 2002 re-
forms are aimed at achieving greater speci-
ficity regarding when the FDA can make a 
request for pediatric trials, establishing a 
process for resolving disputes over labeling 
changes,  and assuring public disclosure of 
the results of all studies conducted under this 
law through publication on FDA’s website. All 
of these provisions taken together provide the 
“carrot” to induce more pediatric research. 
11   21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c). (West Supp. 2006).
12   But, the FDA could still approve generics during this six-month window if the applicant submitted its own research and did not rely on any data from the originator’s   
    submission. (Milne 1999, 269)
13  21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c). (West Supp. 2006).
14  Li et al illustrate the variability of the financial benefits enjoyed by pharmaceutical companies that choose to conduct pediatric clinical trials.  See also Government  
    Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Pediatric Drug Research: Studies Conducted Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act. March  
    2007, at p.39.
15 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of USC, however the exclusivity lan 
    guage remains at 21 U.S.C. § 355a (b), (c) (West Supp. 2006).
16  42 U.S.C. § 284(m).
17  42 U.S.C. § 284(m) (a).
18  42 U.S.C. § 284(m) (b).
19  Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290b (West Supp. 2006).
20  Id. at § 290b (c) (1).
21  FDA is authorized to make written requests under the following circumstances: (1) based on the availability of information concerning the safe and effective use of the 
    drug in the pediatric population; (2) whether new pediatric studies concerning the drug will produce health benefits for children; and (3) whether the reformulation of  
    the drug for pediatric use is necessary. BPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 284m (West Supp. 2006).
5
The Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003 
(PREA)23 had as its purpose the codification of 
a federal regulation promulgated in 1998 by the 
FDA (known as the “Pediatric Rule”) but subse-
quently overturned in court as exceeding FDA 
authority.24 The 2003 legislation expressly au-
thorizes the agency to do what a court refused 
to permit in the case of pediatric drug testing: 
require pediatric testing of certain already-mar-
keted drugs and biological products – regard-
less of their patent status – and to institute a 
presumption in favor of express pediatric test-
ing and labeling for new drugs. 
With respect to new drugs and biologics, the 
PREA requires that a manufacturer submit, 
with any New Drug Application (NDA), ad-
equate data to assess the safety and efficacy 
of the drug for the claimed indications in all rel-
evant pediatric subpopulations, even if the drug 
company has not claimed any specific pediatric 
uses.25  In addition, in the case of new drugs and 
biologics, the law requires the submission of 
data to support dosing and administration infor-
mation for any pediatric population in which the 
manufacturer claims the drug has been found 
to be safe and effective.26 These new drug re-
quirements can be waived by the Secretary if a 
pharmaceutical company can demonstrate that 
(1) necessary studies are impossible or highly 
impracticable;27 (2) the evidence strongly sug-
gests the drug would be ineffective or unsafe 
in all pediatric groups;28 or (3) the drug is not 
thought to represent a meaningful therapeutic 
benefit over existing therapies for children.29 
Apart from a waiver, PREA also permits the FDA 
to grant a deferral to drug manufacturers which 
allows the applicant to submit the pediatric as-
sessment after the submission of an NDA.30 A 
deferral acknowledges that a pediatric assess-
ment is required, but it delays the submission 
of the pediatric study data until a specified date 
after approval of the drug. The FDA may grant 
a deferral if it finds one or more of the follow-
ing: (1) the drug is ready for approval for use 
in adults before the pediatric studies are com-
plete; or (2) pediatric studies should be delayed 
until additional safety or efficacy data have 
been col lected;  or  (3)  there is  another 
appropriate reason for deferral.31 To obtain 
a deferral, the drug manufacturer must submit 
the reasons a deferral is warranted, a descrip-
tion of the planned studies, and evidence that 
the studies will be conducted on time.32 
In practice, drug manufacturers appear to sub-
mit with their NDA a request for a deferral of 
the pediatric assessment for any of the reasons 
stated above. It is possible that at this point the 
FDA will grant a deferral and that the deferral is 
indefinite (i.e., the study does not take place). 
Consistent with this assumption, an FDA draft 
guidance on compliance with PREA points out 
that the failure to submit a pediatric assessment 
will not be the basis for withdrawing approval of 
a new drug33 (FDA 2005, 14). 
For drugs that are already approved and thus 
outside the NDA process, the PREA also gives 
the FDA authority to require pediatric data if the 
drug is currently being used for a substantial 
number of pediatric patients for its labeled 
indications, or if there is reason to believe that 
the drug could represent a meaningful 
therapeutic benefit over existing therapies.34 
Both of these scenarios require a finding by the 
HHS Secretary that the absence of adequate 
label ing could pose signi f icant r isks to 
pediatric patients.35 Even considering its broad 
exceptions, the legislation provides a “stick” in 
the government’s policy arsenal related to 
pediatric health safety. 
The Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003 
(PREA) had as its purpose the codification of 
a federal regulation promulgated in 1998 by 
the FDA (known as the “Pediatric Rule”) but 
subsequently overturned in court in 2002 as 
exceeding FDA authority.  The 2003 legislation 
expressly authorizes the agency to do what a 
court refused to permit in the case of pediatric 
drug testing: require pediatric testing of cer-
tain new and already-marketed drugs and 
biological products – regardless of their pat-
ent status – and to institute a presumption in 
favor of express pediatric testing and label-
ing for new drugs. 
With respect to new drugs and biologics, the 
PREA requires that a manufacturer submit, 
with any New Drug Application (NDA), ad-
equate data to assess the safety and efficacy 
of the drug for the claimed indications in all rel-
evant pediatric subpopulations, even if the drug 
company has not claimed any specific pediatric 
uses.  In addition, in the case of new drugs and 
biologics, the law requires the submission of 
Pediatric Research Equity Act
6data to support dosing and administration infor-
mation for any pediatric population in which the 
manufacturer claims the drug has been found 
to be safe and effective. These new drug re-
quirements can be waived by the Secretary if a 
pharmaceutical company can demonstrate that 
(1) necessary studies are impossible or highly 
impracticable; (2) the evidence strongly sug-
gests the drug would be ineffective or unsafe 
in all pediatric groups; or (3) the drug is not 
thought to represent a meaningful therapeutic 
benefit over existing therapies for children. 
Apart from a waiver, PREA also permits the 
FDA to grant a deferral to drug manufacturers 
which allows the applicant to submit the pedi-
atric assessment after the submission of an 
NDA. A deferral acknowledges that a pediatric 
assessment is required, but it delays the sub-
mission of the pediatric study data until a speci-
fied date after approval of the drug. The FDA 
may grant a deferral if it finds one or more of 
the following: (1) the drug is ready for approval 
for use in adults before the pediatric studies 
are complete; or (2) pediatric studies should be 
delayed until additional safety or efficacy data 
have been collected; or (3) there is another ap-
propriate reason for deferral. To obtain a de-
ferral, the drug manufacturer must submit the 
reasons a deferral is warranted, a description 
of the planned studies, and evidence that the 
studies will be conducted on time. 
In practice, drug manufacturers appear to sub-
mit with their NDA a request for a deferral of 
the pediatric assessment for any of the reasons 
stated above. It is possible that at this point, the 
FDA will grant a deferral and that the deferral 
could be for an indefinite time period, although 
no systematic study has ever been made of the 
extent to which deferrals do in fact become per-
manent. Consistent with this assumption, an 
FDA draft guidance on compliance with PREA 
points out that the failure to submit a pediatric 
assessment will not be the basis for withdraw-
ing approval of a new drug  (FDA 2005, 14). 
For drugs that are already approved and thus 
outside the NDA process, the PREA also gives 
the FDA authority to require pediatric data if the 
drug is currently being used for a substantial 
number of pediatric patients for its labeled indi-
cations, or if there is reason to believe that the 
drug could represent a meaningful therapeutic 
benefit over existing therapies. Both of these 
scenarios require a finding by the HHS Secre-
tary that the absence of adequate labeling could 
pose significant risks to pediatric patients. Even 
considering its broad exceptions, the legislation 
provides a “stick” in the government’s policy ar-
senal related to pediatric health safety. To date, 
however, this provision has not been used.
While there are little public data regarding the 
FDA’s use of PREA to require pediatric drug 
studies, following the promulgation of the Pe-
diatric Rule that ultimately was struck down, 
the FDA instituted a series of actions. Out of a 
total of 517 new drug applications submitted to 
the FDA during the 1999-2002 time period, the 
agency issued 264 waivers and 206 deferrals. 
Ultimately, 129 applications resulted in com-
pleted pediatric studies, 67 of which were not 
associated with pediatric exclusivity. In other 
words, the Pediatric Rule generated additional 
pediatric studies (FDA 2003 and Politis 2005, 
271, 288). Moreover, the government’s use of 
PREA has resulted in 55 label changes.  
Table 1: Pediatric Rule Update 
    April 1999 - December 2002 (FDA 2005)
Total # of
Applications
Waivers Full Waivers Partial
Waivers
Applications
with
Deferred Stud-
ies
Applications
with
Completed 
Studies
Applications
with
Completed 
Studies not
Associated
with
Pediatric
Exclusivity
Total 517 264 164 100 206 129 67
Apr – Dec
2002
113 69 34 35 34 35 15
Apr 1999 –
Mar 2002
404 195 130 65 172 94 52
22   42 U.S.C. § 284m (West Supp. 2006).
23   42 U.S.C. § 290b (West Supp. 2006).
24   Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
25  See Ass’n Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp.2d 204, 212 (D.DC. 2002).
26  FDCA § 505B, 21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2006). These data do not need to come from pediatric trials exclusively, but can be extrapolated from adult  
     studies when possible.
27   FDCA § 505B, 21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2006).
28  21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(4)(A).
29  Id.
30  Id.
31  21 U.S.C. §355c(a)(3).
32  Id.
33  Id.
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The pediatric exclusivity reauthorization debate 
is unfolding in a shifting policy landscape. Part 
of this landscape, as noted, is a possible grow-
ing resistance to off-label prescribing among 
insurers. Another aspect of this changing policy 
landscape is the Medicare Modernization Act 
of 2003, which has resulted in an enormous 
expansion of direct federal involvement in fi-
nancing prescription drugs and biologicals for 
Medicare beneficiaries, thereby raising federal 
budgetary implications for reauthorization. In 
addition, the continued growth of federal and 
state prescription drug expenditures under 
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Programs (SCHIP) underscores the financial 
aspects of exclusivity. Thus, while the evidence 
suggests value in reauthorizing the BPCA, signifi-
cant concerns have been raised over the cost to 
both the federal government and consumers re-
garding the length of time (currently 6 months) of 
the market exclusivity extension.
Thus, it becomes increasingly important to un-
derstand the nature of the contribution made 
by pediatric exclusivity, particularly since PREA 
itself grants the FDA considerable regulatory 
power to require testing. Although evidence 
suggests that patent exclusivity can create a 
strong incentive to conduct requested safety 
studies (Li et al. 2007), the extent to which 
policy makers can rely on incentives alone as a 
means of ensuring appropriate testing remains 
unclear. Evidence suggests that in certain in-
stances, a six-month extension of the patent 
exclusivity can be highly profitable for certain 
drugs while in other instances, the incentive 
does not yield any economic benefit for the 
drug. One study that presented a detailed com-
parison of the cost of pediatric trials in relation 
to the economic return of exclusivity reported 
a median cost per written request of $12.34 
million and a median economic benefit of $134 
million (Li et al. 2007).
In sum, although the direct federal cost as-
sociated with pediatric drug testing may have 
increased, countervailing considerations, if 
anything, point toward greater investment in 
expanded safety testing in children. Thus, it is 
essential to understand the value of the federal 
financial investment that a pediatric exclusiv-
ity policy represents. This financial investment 
comes in the form of higher outlays under federal 
health care programs when lower cost competi-
tors experience delayed entry into the market. 
And of course this investment does not reflect 
the broader governmental and social costs in-
curred by private payers, particularly those ad-
ministering employer-sponsored health plans 
that are themselves heavily tax subsidized.  
The Current Policy Landscape 
Using standard literature review techniques, re-
searchers sought evidence of pediatric clinical 
drug trials from both formally published stud-
ies, as well as data published by the FDA on 
its website  regarding the 132 drugs that have 
been granted exclusivity extensions under the 
pediatric exclusivity provision. In addition to 
reviewing evidence from the FDA website, we 
analyzed the peer-reviewed literature on the 
overall health impact of pediatric clinical tri-
als. A literature search was performed using 
PubMed, Medline and Cochrane databases. 
Various combinations of the following keywords 
were used: pediatric clinical trials, pediatric 
pharmaceutical interventions, pediatric drug 
therapy, public health, health benefits, health 
impact, as well as the individual drug names 
that have been tested under the pediatric ex-
clusivity provision.  We excluded studies that 
presented the results of individual clinical trials 
of drugs that were not tested under the pediat-
ric exclusivity provision.
Review of the literature 
The purpose of this analysis was twofold: first, 
to examine the available evidence regarding 
the impact and efficacy of pediatric exclusivity 
in the years following the enactment of pediat-
ric exclusivity in 1997 and its 2002 legislative 
reauthorization; second, to determine whether 
it is possible to develop preliminary estimates 
of cost savings that might be achieved  from a 
pediatric exclusivity incentive, thereby balanc-
ing the cost of governmental investment. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
34  The FDA’s Draft Guidance (FDA 2005) clarifies that failure to submit a pediatric assessment could instigate an FDA injunction or seizure proceeding if the drug is   
     found to be misbranded for lack of pediatric data. Since the guidance has not been issued as a rule and is still in draft, this outcome is unlikely.
35  21 U.S.C. §355c(b)(1).
36  Id.
37  http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/Prea_label_post-mar_2_mtg.htm
38  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42      
     U.S.C.).
39  The Congressional Budget Office has recently estimated the impact of the modified extension of pediatric exclusivity contained in the Senate’s reform measure at    
     $150 million over 10 years due to the delay of market entry by generic competitors. 
40  http://www.fda.gov
41  Compliance was measured using the medical possession ratio (MPR = prescription days filled/number days in prescription period). 
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In our analysis we have attempted to compute 
the potential savings that may accrue from 
improved pediatric labeling resulting from pe-
diatric drug trials undertaken in response to 
the pediatric exclusivity incentive. Our main 
interest in assessing potential cost savings for 
consumers, insurers, patients and others that 
can be attributed to improved pediatric test-
ing and labeling grows out of the survey of the 
literature described above, although previous 
research and analysis has been scant at best. 
A 2001 report from the FDA (FDA 2001) con-
cluded that improved pediatric labeling would 
lead to savings of $228 million annually as a 
result of reduction in hospital costs associated 
with five major diagnoses: asthma, HIV/AIDS, 
cancer, pneumonia, and kidney infection. This 
estimate however, was based on somewhat 
arbitrary assumptions (see below). While all 
such analyses, including our own require such 
assumptions, we opted to base our own con-
clusions on research findings reported in the 
general literature.
Relying on a relatively broad body of literature 
on adherence and non-compliance with medi-
cations, our analysis is founded on an assump-
tion that improved drug labeling will improve 
compliance by children, and our approach has 
been to map the relationship between improved 
compliance and reduced costs associated with 
hospital and medical care and other financial 
burdens of illness in children. For this cost es-
timate, we rely on published studies and thus 
limit the number of conditions to be examined; 
however, unlike the previous FDA study, we 
are able to use assumptions based on previ-
ous analyses, rather than invoke more arbitrary 
rules of thumb (in its 2001 study, the FDA ar-
rived at its estimate using the assumption that 
25% of the excess incidence of hospitalizations 
for children versus adults could be eliminated 
due to improved labeling). 
Another analysis that has some relevance to 
the policy question posed was performed by 
Sokol et al (Sokol et al. 2005).  Using data from 
a large insurance plan, the authors estimated 
the relationship between medication adherence 
and outcomes for four major medical condi-
tions: diabetes, hypertension, hypercholester-
olemia, and CHF. They found that an increase 
in compliance from a “medium” compliance 
range to a “high” range resulted in declines in 
the risk of hospitalization ranging from 48% to 
12%. However, when the authors considered 
the impact of compliance on direct net medi-
cal costs (outpatient and inpatient costs, minus 
drug costs), the findings were mixed: the in-
crease compliance resulted in cost reductions 
for diabetes and hypertension (30% and 8% 
respectively), no significant change for hyper-
cholesterolemia, and a 12% increase in costs 
associated with CHF. Even though one out of 
every five subjects in the Sokol sample were 
aged 0-18, it was not possible to extrapolate 
the effects for any specific age group from pub-
lished tables. Based on our extensive search of 
the literature, no study similar to that performed 
by Sokol - linking compliance directly with 
medical costs specific to children - has been 
published to date. However, it was possible to 
extrapolate for the pediatric population using a 
combination of results to address this limitation, 
as explained below.
Estimates of potential cost savings
9The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
recently studied the impact of the BPCA on pe-
diatric trials and labeling changes. The report 
illustrates the relationship between legislative 
policy and improvements in pediatric drug test-
ing. It also highlights the difficulty in conducting 
pediatric trials if the drug sponsor declines to 
do so. Table 2 summarizes this information.
1.  A decade of pediatric drug safety testing shows the importance of an active pediatric drug   
 safety policy 
FINDINGS 
Table 2: Drug Safety Testing Under BPCA (2002-2005) 
Total number 
of written 
requests 
issued for 
studies of 
on-patent 
drugs
214
Total number 
of written 
requests 
declined by 
drug sponsor
41
Total declined 
studies 
referred to 
FNIH
9  0
Total FNIH 
funded 
studies 
173
Total number 
of studies 
agreed to by 
drug sponsor 
as a result of 
a written 
request
59
Total number 
of studies 
completed 
by December, 
2005
55
Total number 
of exclusivity 
determinations 
made by 
December, 
2005
52
Total number 
of studies in 
which drug 
was granted 
exclusivity
45
Total number 
of pediatric 
labeling changes 
involving drugs 
with exclusivity 
protection
Highlights of findings from the literature:
these pediatric trials exceeds $43 million. Cost and a lack of funding meant that as of December 2005, none of the referred drugs had 
undergone study.
•	 Under the BPCA, when drug sponsor declines a written request for pediatric study, the FDA may refer the drug to the FNIH for further study.  
 Since the BPCA’s inception, however, only 9 of the 41 declined studies (22%) have been referred. According to NIH estimates, the cost of 
•		 The drugs, for which written study requests were issued address a variety of conditions. The severity of these conditions varies greatly, from  
 simple conditions such as headaches to more severe conditions such as leukemia, chronic pain management, weight loss, diabetes, 
 rheumatoid arthritis and the treatment of HIV.
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•	 Of the 52 drugs granted pediatric exclusivity, 45 (87 percent) were later subject to one or more labeling changes. Of these 45, one-third  
 had alterations to the age limits for use;39  two-thirds had changes to adverse event information; recommended dosages were modified in  
 forty percent; and almost 30 percent had amendments to safety and efficacy indicators.
•		 In nearly one quarter, labeling changes included a determination that the drug had not been proven safe or efficacious for pediatric use  
 (thereby requiring further pediatric studies); seventeen percent were not recommended for pediatric use and seven percent had changes 
 to contraindication information. One drug was completely withdrawn from the market and 2 showed results that were not significantly 
 different from placebos.
•	 Of the 52 drugs granted pediatric exclusivity, 19 percent involved one label change, 25 percent involved 2 label changes, 33 percent 
 involved  3 label changes and 10 percent involved 4 label changes. None involved more than four label changes.  
42 Age limit means either the approved ages were extended or they were shortened (i.e. was 12-18 years now 3-18 years or was 3-18 years now 12-18 years old.
The literature on pediatric drug testing con-
firms the importance of an improved pediatric 
testing policy. Adams et al (Adams et al. 2001, 
706) found that use of cromolyn significantly 
decreased the risk for hospitalization and 
emergency department visits for children with 
asthma. Whalley et al (Whalley et al. 2002, 
1133) found that use of pimecrolimus to treat 
pediatric atopic dermatitis was associated with 
a significant increase in the quality life of care-
givers. Gillman et al (Gillman et al. 2002, 687) 
found that the use of cetirizine to treat pediatric 
seasonal allergic rhinitis was associated with a 
significant increase in the health-related quality 
of life (physical, psychological, and social func-
tioning and well-being) of the patient.
No studies were found that addressed the 
health impact of pediatric clinical trials in gen-
eral since enactment of the pediatric safety law. 
However, we did find two relevant articles on the 
specific impact of pediatric cancer clinical trials. 
Both Pratt (Pratt 1996, 169-172) and Caldwell 
et al (Caldwell et al. 2004, 808) address the 
significant advances made in childhood cancer 
survival rates and attribute this success to the 
large number and highly coordinated nature of 
pediatric cancer clinical trials. Cancer is one of 
the leading causes of death in children, second 
only to accidents for children over one year of 
age (Pratt 1996, 169). The reasons for testing 
cancer drugs specifically in children include: 1) 
cancers may present, progress and respond to 
treatment differently in children than in adults; 
and 2) toxicity levels and tolerance of treatment 
agents may also differ (Pratt 1996, 170). 
Because of the compelling nature of cancer, 
almost all pediatric cancer patients in the U.S. 
are treated by physicians or institutions partici-
pating in the Children’s Cancer Group or Pedi-
atric Oncology Group, each of which conducts 
national and international pediatric clinical trials 
(Pratt 1996, 170). This allows for substantial 
coordination and information sharing regard-
ing the results of clinical trials and the resulting 
revisions to treatment protocols. The positive 
health impact of the large number and coordi-
nated nature of pediatric cancer clinical trials in 
the US is undisputed: survival rates for some 
pediatric cancers, both in the US and interna-
tionally, have increased dramatically over the 
last 40 years. For example, the survival rate 
of acute lymphoblastic leukemia increased 
from 5% in 1960 to over 70% in 1996 (Pratt 
1996, 169). The experience of pediatric cancer 
clinical trials in the US confirms the long-term 
health benefits of pediatric clinical trials. In light 
of this success, study authors report that “pedi-
atric cancer trials offer a paradigm for pediatric 
clinical research” (Caldwell et al. 2004, 808).
2.  Adherence to more appropriate drug regimens – a possible outcome of greater testing – would be  
 associated with both improved health outcomes and lower pediatric health care costs 
Few would disagree that increased pediatric 
testing and the resulting improvements in la-
beling should improve the quality of pediatric 
health care. Improved labeling may be expect-
ed to reduce inappropriate drug utilization, by 
identifying those circumstances in which the 
use of a particular drug is contraindicated in 
children or requires a previously unanticipated 
dose adjustment. Improved labeling should 
also increase appropriate utilization of a partic-
ular drug therapy in situations in which testing 
prompts labeling changes that identify safe and 
efficacious use of drugs previously underuti-
lized in pediatric populations. 
Taken together these changes should contrib-
ute to improved standards of care, provided of 
course that they are adequately promulgated to 
prescribers, and that prescribers modify their 
prescribing patterns accordingly. Significantly, 
we were unable to identify any literature that 
directly reported changes in prescriber behav-
ior arising from labeling changes, and we found 
a similar lack of substantive, peer-reviewed 
literature on the effects of pediatric testing on 
health care costs associated with inappropriate 
drug use. 
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43 P3 needs to be included because the estimates for P1 and P2 from Bauman et al (Bauman et al. 2002) pertain to children likely to be hospitalized (conditional 
    probability).
44 We used data on all hospitalization costs for the U.S. population and children, and the age distribution hospitalized patients to extrapolate the average cost of a pedi    
   atric asthma-related hospitalization. In 2002 there were 128,000 pediatric asthma-related hospitalization and 404,483 total asthma-related hospitalizations.
45 Further detail on methods and values are available from a technical appendix upon request.
46 To adjust for inflation, we trended forward estimate reported in Weiss et al (Weiss et al. 2001, 5) for 1994 and 1998 using the medical component of CPI.
47 Level of caregiver compliance was ranked on the following scale: high (no admission of noncompliance), medium (1 instance of noncompliance admitted), and low   
    (>1 instance of noncompliance admitted).
48 Calculation : Annual cost of ADR-caused pediatric hospitalizations for kids 1-17 years old
Thus in order to model the impact of improved 
labeling on health care costs, we elected to use 
the impact of changes in patient compliance 
as a proxy for the effects of both reductions 
in inappropriate use of medication in children 
and increases in appropriate use. In this way 
we were able to estimate the associated health 
care cost savings arising from better health 
outcomes. In addition, given that inappropriate 
drug use often results in adverse drug reac-
tions, we were also able to calculate the costs 
of hospitalizations resulting from adverse drug 
reactions, a cost that may be expected to be 
reduced to a significant extent with improved 
drug labeling.
While it is acknowledged that the assumptions 
made at each step introduce an additional level 
of uncertainty in these estimates, the analysis 
is inherently conservative in that it assumes 
that more appropriate labeling will have an ef-
fect similar to a modest improvement in com-
pliance. Moreover the analysis is limited to 
assessing the impact only in the treatment of 
asthma. While the most common chronic illness 
affecting children (6.2 million or 9% of children 
according to a recent GAO report), asthma is 
only one of several conditions for which inap-
propriate prescribing may be expected to con-
tribute to unnecessary hospitalizations (GAO 
2007). Asthma is the leading cause of hospital-
ization for children between 1 and 17 years old, 
according to a recent report from the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
(AHRQ 2005). In 2002 alone, AHRQ reported 
128,000 asthma-related hospitalizations among 
children, with a mean charge of $10,400 for an 
asthma-related hospitalization. Noncompliance 
with clinical guidelines for asthma therapy re-
sults in a significant increase in the risk of an 
asthma-related hospitalization among affected 
children (Bauman et al. 2002). Therefore, an 
increase in compliance with clinical guidelines 
should substantially reduce the number of hos-
pital admissions for asthmatic children, thereby 
generating significant cost savings. 
The methodology below was employed to estimate the savings that would result from an increase in compliance with clinical guidelines: 
Hospital costs associated with a pediatric compliance group = 
P1 * P2 * P3 * N * C
Where  P1 = % in the compliance group (low, medium or high)
  P2 = % risk of hospitalization in that compliance group
  P3 = % risk of hospitalization for the population40 
  N  = number of asthmatic children in the population (ages 1-17)
  C  = average hospital charge for asthmatic children (ages 1-17)41 
 
The next step was to calculate changes in costs 
resulting from a shift of the low compliance 
group to medium compliance, and from a shift of 
medium compliance group to high compliance. 
In addition, we relied on past studies to obtain 
aggregate estimates of direct medical costs 
other than hospitalizations, as well as indirect 
costs due to childhood asthma (Weiss et al. 
2001, 5). For non-hospital costs we assumed 
that non-compliance would result in similar ef-
fects as in hospital costs. Thus, we acknowl-
edge the relatively imprecise nature of the esti-
mates for the non-hospital component; for this 
our estimates should be taken only as a reflec-
tion of relative order of magnitude.
The most recent year for which relevant hospi-
talization cost data were available was 2002. 
Dollar amounts for hospital and other medical 
care were trended forward to 2005 using the 
medical component of the consumer price in-
dex (CPI). The value of lost productivity was 
trended forward using the overall CPI. Results 
are given below. 
Our analysis indicates that increasing compli-
ance with prescribed medications would have 
resulted in an 11% decline in asthma-related 
hospital costs for children (ages 0-17).  In dol-
lar terms this reduction amounts to $96 million 
in 2005 dollars. Of this, about $32 million would 
result from increasing compliance of low com-
pliers, while $62 million would be associated 
with increasing ‘medium’ or partial compliance 
to full compliance.  
Hospital costs
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=   # pediatric hospitalizations (1-17yo) x % caused by ADRs x avg cost per hospitalizations 
=   $ 256,650,000 in 2002 dollars = $ 290,438,655.46 in 2005 dollars
Note however that this assumes full effect in reducing ADRs due to appropriate labeling. Values for the formula above were obtained information as follows: In 2002, 
there were 1.711 million hospital discharges for children 1-17 (AHRQ 2005, 12); In 2003, the average total charge for all pediatric hospitalizations was $7,500. (AHRQ 
2003, 35)
49  It is acknowledged that there may be some overlap in ADR-related savings in hospital costs and those attributable to improved compliance as calculated in the    
     previous section. However since the magnitude of ADR-related savings is small compared to the potential savings achievable through improved compliance, and the  
     estimates of savings due to fewer ADRs are conservative, the impact of this potential “double counting” is likely to be small.
50  Using similar methodology we calculated the hospitalization cost savings that would result from increasing compliance with medical regimens for additional conditions 
     for which incidence and cost of hospitalization for the pediatric population were available from the literature. This yielded cost savings  resulting from increased com 
     pliance $53,649,046., $45,016,973., $48,756,239.36 (in 2005 dollars) for hospitalizations associated with  pediatric pneumonia, pediatric affective or mood disorder,  
     and pediatric epilepsy/convulsions respectively. Note However, that corresponding information for pediatric noncompliance could not be found for these conditions as  
     had been the case for pediatric asthma; this required us to make an ad hoc assumption that the increased compliance for these medical conditions would result in  
     the same percent hospitalization cost savings as the 11% hospitalization cost savings that was reported for pediatric asthma. 
A previous study reported that pediatric asth-
ma results in about 11.8 million missed school 
days. It was further estimated that, on average, 
this resulted in loss of caregiver productivity 
valued at $108 per day (2005 dollars) (Weiss et 
al. 2000, 495). Assuming that increased com-
pliance (in the same manner as described in 
our Methodology section) would have the same 
impact on the incidence of school days lost as 
on the incidence of hospitalizations, we calcu-
lated that an additional $16 million dollars could 
be saved. 
Value of Caregiver Lost Productivity
Other Medical Costs
ADRs resulting from inappropriate use of medi-
cation are another potential source of morbid-
ity and result in higher health care costs that 
should be reduced with improved drug labeling. 
It has been estimated that 2% of all pediatric 
hospital admissions are prompted by adverse 
drug reactions (i.e. asthma and others but ex-
cluding cancer-related ADRs and NICU admis-
sions) (Mitchell et al. 1988, 24). Using national 
data, this implies that eliminating ADRs for chil-
dren ages 1-17 could have potentially resulted 
in overall savings of $290 million. (Note that 
costs for newborns and children under one year 
of age are excluded since they are greatly sus-
ceptible to outlier costs.) Since hospitalization 
from ADRs cannot be fully corrected through 
better labeling (some ADR-related hospitaliza-
tions arise from other causes), this figure rep-
resents the strongest possible effect, since the 
literature does not allow for adjustment of ADR-
related hospitalizations to reflect other causes.
Cost Savings from Reductions in Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs)
Given that asthma accounts for 1.82% of all 
hospital costs for children (AHRQ 2003), from 
the above we further calculated that about 
$5.29 million in ADR-related savings in hospi-
tal costs may be attributable to asthma alone. 
Adding this to the previous components of cost 
savings associated with improved compliance 
and reduction in ADRs (hospital care, other 
medical and school related lost productivity) we 
arrived at an annual total of about $225 million. 
Note that we calculated similar savings for sev-
eral other major pediatric medical conditions, 
but with only partial data available from past 
studies. As a result these estimates required 
stronger assumptions.  While we cannot be 
certain that improved labeling would fully in-
duce all of the behavioral changes by consum-
ers and providers needed to achieve all of the 
above cost savings, we note that our estimates 
should be taken as a lower bound, since they 
are based on rather conservative assumptions, 
(e.g. lowest compliance would not be raised to 
full compliance, productivity losses due only 
to lost school days); therefore, our estimates 
Asthma, All Sources 
Using a similar approach we estimate that in-
creasing compliance would result in total asth-
ma-related healthcare cost savings of 11% of 
the total cost of non-hospital asthma-related 
healthcare (excluding drug costs) for children in 
2002, or about $107 million (in 2005 dollars).
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Table 3: Potential Annual Savings Due to Improved Pediatric Labeling (Asthma, Ages 1-17)48
51  We wish to note an important caveat: the methods from the CBO Cost Estimate (CBO 2007) were not provided.  Therefore these estimates remain to be verified.
52 A summary of these calculations is given in the body of the report.
53 These references are the sources of the variables that were used to calculate the potential cost savings due to improved pediatric labeling. For complete references,  
    please see attached bibliography.
54 A recent New Yorker article focused on mental illness in children illustrates the degree of risk that can arise when children with serious mental health conditions are   
   treated through inadequately tested prescription drug regimens combining multiple drugs over a prolonged time period. (Groopman 2007, 28-34).
Source of Potential Savings: Potential Annual Savings in 
millions (2005 Dollars)
Data Sources49 
All Sources: $224.3
Improved Compliance:
 Hospitalization Costs $96 Bauman et al, 2002; AHRQ Fact Book, 2003 
and 2005; American Lung Association Fact 
Sheet, 2006
 Other Medical Costs $107 Piecoro et al, 2001
 Averted Caretaker 
 productivity loss
$16 Bauman et al, 2002; 
Weiss et al, 2000 
Averted ADR: $5.3 Mitchell et al, 1988; AHRQ Fact Book, 
2003 and 2005
Although the direct federal cost associated 
with pediatric drug testing may have increased, 
countervailing considerations, if anything, point 
toward the need for expanded safety testing. 
Not only does broader testing respond to the 
growing demand for evidence-based care, but 
it also contributes to the growing focus on pa-
tient safety.  To the extent that better testing ul-
timately leads to more cost-effective treatments 
and therapies – through the substitution of less 
costly drug regimens for higher-cost and avoid-
able medical and institutional care – promoting 
a culture of safety ultimately is considered cost 
effective as well.
Perhaps the single most important factor that 
militates in the direction of greater emphasis on 
pediatric testing is the growing focus on patient 
safety and medical error reduction as equally 
fundamental aspects of a national health quality 
policy.  Achieving such basic reforms may entail 
societal investment in the research and studies 
that shed light on safe practices for the popu-
lation as a whole, as well as sub-populations 
such as children, who are deemed particularly 
vulnerable to error and adverse events.  
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Averted costs (savings) due to better compli-
ance or reduced ADRs represent the potential 
benefits of pediatric labeling.  Preliminary esti-
mates suggest a  total cost (in additional drug 
purchases) to the Federal government of  $150 
million from 2008 to 2017 due to delayed ge-
neric entry under marketing exclusivity provi-
sions, with an additional $26 million incurred by 
states over a similar period (CBO 2007). While 
comparing these costs with our estimates of 
benefits above ($220 due to pediatric asthma 
compliance, and $290 million due to reduced 
ADRs for most conditions, annually) is to some 
extent an “apple and oranges” comparison, the 
orders of magnitude suggest that efforts to im-
prove pediatric labeling may be cost effective 
from a societal perspective, even with market 
exclusivity arrangements such as those under 
the BPCA.  
Social Benefits and Social Costs 
should be taken as a lower bound, suggesting 
the full level of savings is attainable through 
simple policy intervention. Moreover the cost 
reductions we find for only one major medical 
condition, asthma (albeit from several sources) 
approximate the total savings in hospital costs 
the FDA found for five medical conditions, sug-
gesting a greater benefit from labeling than pre-
viously thought. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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In sum, improving pediatric drug safety policy 
is a compelling goal that justifies strong gov-
ernmental investment. How this investment is 
made – through greater direct government in-
vestment in testing, greater regulation of test-
ing by the pharmaceutical industry, incentiviza-
tion of industry testing, or a combination of the 
three approaches – is a far broader question 
and one that transcends this specific analysis. 
This analysis does suggest that if adherence to 
appropriate drug regimens is viewed as a pos-
sible, downstream outcome of better testing, 
then incentives can be associated with impor-
tant results in terms of both health outcomes 
and health care costs. Thus, incentivization, 
along with other policy interventions, can be 
viewed as one of an arsenal of policy levers 
whose aim is to improve the safety and quality 
of pediatric care.
Several observations are also worth noting. 
First, in view of what would appear to be a gen-
erous incentive, BPCA should be modified to 
create a more robust standard for testing. In our 
view, this more robust approach is warranted 
despite the existence of the government’s direct 
regulatory authority over testing under PREA, 
since the government tends to use its authority 
only to a limited degree. As a result, lawmakers 
might consider strengthening BPCA’s incentiv-
ization approach by requiring manufacturers 
who elect not to undertake a requested test to 
submit clear and convincing evidence that pe-
diatric testing would result in a direct and net 
loss to the manufacturer in comparison to the 
long term value of the incentive. Since pediatric 
exclusivity effectively means that government is 
paying companies – through higher drug pric-
ing – to study the effects of drugs in children, 
the payment should result in a presumption of 
testing in our opinion in the absence of strong 
evidence that such an incentive in fact does 
not exist in particular cases. In some cases, in-
centives may be lucrative, while in others, they 
may be modest. But the fact that some cases of 
exclusivity are less profitable should not dimin-
ish the net value of the incentive. The key issue 
is the safety of drug use in children. 
Second, this study does not compare govern-
ment expenditures through incentives to the 
cost of alternative government approaches to 
pediatric drug testing through regulation and 
direct investment in testing. It may well be that 
from a purely economic vantage point, it would 
be less expensive and more reliable for the 
government to simply underwrite the cost of pe-
diatric drug testing and to move toward a policy 
in which tests that are believed to be necessary 
by the government’s chief scientific body sim-
ply are performed. Indeed, in our opinion there 
is much to be learned about the government’s 
use of its regulatory authority under PREA. Un-
der what circumstances has the government 
used its PREA powers and with what results? 
What has been the health outcomes record 
in the case of pediatric use of drugs for which 
studies were recommended but indefinitely 
deferred? These questions all compel further 
research in the quest for an effective pediatric 
drug safety policy. 
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Leona Cuttler, M.D., Professor of Pediatrics and Bioethics, and Director of the Rainbow Center 
for Child Health Policy, Rainbow Babies and Children’s Hospital, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland Ohio, who lent her expertise and 
thoughtful comments to this analysis.
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